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Abstract: Situating the ‘post-ecologist turn’ within the framework of post-politics, we not only 
investigate why environmental issues are so easily represented in consensual and technocratic 
terms, but also seek avenues for repoliticisation.  We thereby try to avoid the pitfall of a 
voluntaristic or substantively normative approach to what repoliticisation can mean. By 
pointing to the subtle polemic on a metalevel which lurks beneath even the most consensual 
discourse, a potential starting point for repoliticisation is uncovered, which also enables a 
political re-reading of the ‘post-ecologist turn’. Finally, we argue that the same characteristics 
that make the environmental question liable to depoliticisation, can also turn it into a field of 
politicisation par excellence. 
 
Keywords: the political, post-politics, post-ecologism, climate change, repoliticisation, 
hegemony 
 
Introduction 
‘Global warming is too serious for the world any longer to ignore its danger or split into 
opposing factions on it’, Tony Blair (2005) famously stated in a speech in 2005. Blair thus 
explicitly calls for a depoliticisation of climate change. Similarly, one of his well-known 
advisors, Anthony Giddens (2009, p. 114), argues: ‘(c)limate change should be lifted out of a 
right-left context, where it has no place […] there has to be agreement that the issue is so 
important and all-encompassing that the usual party conflicts should be suspended or muted’. 
Such statements are significant in several regards. They not only show how mainstream 
environmental concerns have become but they especially express how environmental 
questions, such as climate change, are at the same time depoliticised (Swyngedouw 2007, 
2010a): if we want to effectively tackle the problem, it is argued, there ought to be consensus, 
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usually around managerial and technocratic solutions that remain within the parameters of 
what currently exists. 
These depoliticised discourses, often put forward by defenders of the newly popular 
Green Economy project, are of course only the latest expression of a trend that has deeper 
historical roots. Over the last few decades, the discourse on environmental politics has shifted 
significantly: while many eco-political discourses in the 1970s focussed on a fundamental 
transformation of social structures, from the 1980s onwards they have increasingly been 
characterised by the search for greener versions of the modern, market and growth-oriented, 
liberal democratic model.1 Typical examples include the advocacy of ecological modernisation 
(Mol and Spaargaren 2000, Spaargaren and Mol 1992), post-environmentalism (Buck 2013), 
the Green New Deal (Group 2008), Green Growth (OECD 2010) and the Green Economy (UNEP 
2011, 2012).  
One of the most forceful conceptualisations of this shift is Ingolfur Blühdorn’s (2013) 
theory of the ‘post-ecologist turn’ (see also Blühdorn 1997, 2002). ‘(B)oth the ecologist 
critique of modernity and the ecologist belief in a comprehensively different society have 
become largely exhausted’, Blühdorn argues (2013, p. 19). ‘(T)he historically radical and 
transformative elements of environmental movements and eco-political thought are blunted 
through mainstreaming and have been reconfigured by comprehensive cultural change’ 
(Blühdorn and Welsh 2007, p. 185). Due to a modernisation-induced value and culture shift, 
the initial radical critique has been replaced by the attempt to use market-driven, industrial 
and growth-oriented policies. The result is a paradoxical situation: a general awareness of the 
seriousness of the environmental crisis is combined with what Blühdorn (2007b) calls ‘the 
management of unsustainability’: the attempt to sustain the unsustainable characteristics of 
current society. Indeed, what brings ecological modernisation, Green Growth, the Green 
Economy and a number of other contemporary environmental discourses together is their 
attempt to present themselves as taking the environmental crisis very seriously, while at the 
same time refraining from any fundamental questioning of existing social systems and 
structures (Blühdorn 2013). In other words, what is characteristic of current eco-political 
discourses is that they try to answer environmental concerns in a way that makes ‘[...] sure 
that things remain the same, that nothing really changes, that life (or at least our lives) can go 
on as before’ (Cook and Swyngedouw 2012, p. 1973). Significantly, as we already suggested, 
these new eco-political discourses go together with a call for all-round cooperation and the 
rejection of conflict. Confronted with the urgency and scale of the challenge, it is argued, we 
no longer have the luxury to engage in time-consuming struggles that only hamper the 
cooperative action that is needed now. That is why these discourses can be called 
fundamentally post-political (Swyngedouw 2007, 2010a). 
Blühdorn (2013, p. 16) makes a parallel diagnosis when he argues that recent shifts in 
eco-political discourses have their counterpart in simultaneous shifts in democratic politics: 
‘democratic values and the innovative modes of decentralised, participatory government [..] 
are metamorphosing into tools for managing the condition of sustained ecological and social 
unsustainability’. According to Blühdorn, the result is a condition of post-democracy. 
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Here we aim to contribute to this debate on the post-democratic shift in eco-political 
discourses by focusing on the problem of post-politics or depoliticisation. According to 
political theorists such as Claude Lefort (1988), the loss of the political is the central element 
threatening to undermine democracy. Indeed, the very condition of possibility of democracy 
is to make the political dimension of social relations and of our relation to ‘nature’ visible, and 
to turn it into the object of debate and conflict. Underlying the post-democratic trend in eco-
political discourses, we will argue, is therefore a tendency towards post-politics. On the basis 
of the work of political theorists such as Jacques Rancière, Claude Lefort, Carl Schmitt, Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, we aim to develop the tools to better conceptualise this post-
political (and related post-democratic) development.  
In our view, what Blühdorn calls the post-ecologist turn is a specific manifestation of a 
more general tendency to depict society in post-political terms. Yet, with regard to 
environmental discourses, this depoliticisation adopts specific forms. Therefore, we aim here 
to contribute to a better understanding of what depoliticisation with regard to environmental 
politics is about, and to explore the conditions for repoliticisation. Through this contribution, 
we also aim to think beyond the post-ecologist condition. Admittedly, Blühdorn’s diagnosis is 
strong and comprehensive. Yet, as Derek Bell (2013, p. 14) has argued: ‘We must, at least, 
hope that Blühdorn’s diagnosis of the contemporary condition is incorrect, or that it is a 
condition that we can transcend’. Blühdorn’s analysis has indeed been called pessimistic 
(Szerszynski 2007). The reason for this pessimism is perhaps that Blühdorn grounds his 
diagnosis in a deeper process of modernisation, which he analyses through the lens of Ronald 
Inglehart’s theory of value shifts in modernity and Niklas Luhmann’s thesis of increasing 
system differentiation. The disappearance of the conditions of possibility for a genuine 
ecologist politics results from this on-going modernisation process, Blühdorn suggests. 
His sociological, rather than political, explanation of this shift has important 
implications. Does the attempt to provide a sociological foundation for the post-ecologist turn 
not reinforce this apparent pessimism? Is it not possible, and perhaps desirable, to develop a 
political interpretation of this turn, which at the same time explains the resulting 
depoliticisation, and makes it possible to think about repoliticisation? In his response to 
scholars who criticise his so-called pessimism, Blühdorn (2013, p. 17) argues that it is 
important to make a ‘rigorous distinction between eco-political campaigning and socio-
political analysis’. In other words, criticising the post-ecologist thesis from a voluntaristic or 
substantively normative point of view threatens to disregard the need to analyse the 
contemporary terrain of environmental politics in an unprejudiced way (see also Bell 2013, p. 
12).  
Following Blühdorn’s warning, we will try to reconceptualise repoliticisation while at 
the same time avoiding the pitfall of a voluntaristic or normative standpoint. Here we develop 
a rather ‘sober’ descriptive-analytical conception of the political, which tries to circumvent 
any normative a priori and moves beyond conceptualisations of the political that start from a 
social subject (e.g. the ‘excluded’) and/or a normative principle (e.g. equality). We argue that 
such conceptualisations often unduly limit ‘the political’ to actions and discourses that have a 
 4 
 
normative or emancipatory basis, and thus narrow the scope of what ‘the political’ can mean 
in the environmental domain.  
In the next section, we will first discuss what the concept of ‘the political’ specifically 
means, and we will defend the thesis that there is indeed a problem of depoliticisation in 
current eco-political discourses. We then move on, in the third section, to pinpoint the crucial 
determinants that make these discourses more vulnerable to depoliticisation than discourses 
in other domains. The focus of the article, however, is on how we can find possible sources of 
(re)politicisation. Surveying the literature on post-politics, it seems to be easier to diagnose 
depoliticisation than to provide effective suggestions for overcoming it.  
In order to rethink the conditions for repoliticising environmental issues, in the fourth 
section we point to a paradox that is present in many post-political discourses: in a subtle way, 
the latter are often significantly polemical. Depoliticisation, paradoxically, always entails a 
struggle, but then on a meta-level. Drawing on the analysis of this meta-struggle, we will in 
the fifth section shed new light on the post-ecologist turn, showing that it is based on a 
fundamentally political process of re-appropriation and meta-political struggle. On this basis, 
we argue in the final section that the same characteristics that make environmental issues so 
liable for depoliticisation could, interestingly, turn it into a field of politicisation par excellence, 
understood as a scene composed of a multiplicity of conflicting positions which can become 
visible and therefore contestable. The appearance of such a scene is of crucial importance for 
effective and democratic environmental change. 
 
Post-politics 
In his book Climate Change and Society, John Urry (2011, p. 90) takes issue with the thesis that 
we have entered a post-political era. There is a ‘range of different politics surrounding 
changing climates’, he states, referring as an example to direct protests such as climate camps, 
which sharply critique capitalism as one of the root causes of climate change. He points out 
that the public debate about climate change displays a variety of approaches and answers, 
and concludes that it is ‘hard to argue that this huge array of different arguments is all “post-
political”’ (Urry 2011, p. 93). 
Urry is arguably right when he questions overly generalised depictions of the present 
as ‘post-political’. However, when he suggests that post-politics is not an issue at all, he tends 
to miss what is truly at stake. Urry argues that the multiplicity of actors putting forward 
different analyses and answers to climate change proves that the environmental scene is (still) 
highly politicised. Political theorists such as Lefort (1988) or Mouffe (2006) would argue that 
the presence of this multiplicity is evident: the social is always torn by conflict, division and 
the exercise of power. Post-politics involves something else: it concerns whether or not the 
discourses through which the social is interpreted account for these realities – i.e., conflict, 
division and power - and make them visible. Fundamentally, depoliticisation is situated on the 
level of representation.  
In order to understand what is at stake, it is important to heed the distinction made by 
many political theorists (Lefort 1988, Schmitt 1996, Rancière 1999, Mouffe 2006, Marchart 
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2007) between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Leaving aside important differences for the 
moment, we can say that many of these authors understand ‘politics’ as referring to the 
conventional notion of politics as a differentiated sphere within society that is centred around 
the state. ‘The political’, in contrast, has a broader scope in that it refers to a symbolic or 
discursive order that represents the social in a particular way: ‘the political’ is a discourse that 
acknowledges the existence of conflict, power and division. 
Schmitt (1996) was the first author to draw this distinction. In his book The Concept of 
the Political, he argues that the political cannot be defined in terms of the state, as it usually 
is, but that the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political. The latter, 
therefore, needs its own criterion, which, according to Schmitt, is the distinction between 
friend and enemy. He coins his concept of the political in order to analyse depoliticisation, 
which he sees as the result of discourses or symbolisations that conceal conflicts, decisions 
and power. For Schmitt, (re)politicisation is about openly declaring and disclosing 
friend/enemy distinctions: only when conflict is acknowledged and given a place can it be 
fought in a more or less orderly way.  
A core question for theorists of the political is whether it is possible to get rid of power 
and conflict, or whether they are constitutive social realities. From a discourse-theoretical 
perspective, Laclau and Mouffe (2001, Mouffe 2006) have argued that there is no social 
relation that is not the product of power, because the social is always hegemonically 
constituted. Crucially, each hegemonic construction entails certain exclusions, which can 
generate forms of antagonism. Depoliticisation occurs when the exercise of hegemonic power 
and the antagonisms that result from it are covered up. When ecological modernisation 
discourses become hegemonic, for example, voices that formulate a radical criticism of 
technocracy tend to become excluded. With the increasing hegemony of green economy 
discourses, voices criticising the downsides of the marketisation of nature (for example 
through emission trading schemes), are at risk of remaining unheard.  
In his influential interpretation of the concept of ‘the political’, Lefort (1986, 1988) 
argues that society does not have a spontaneous self-understanding, but always needs to be 
interpreted and symbolised. The political, in his view, is the symbolic order through which the 
social is interpreted, and therefore symbolically instituted. This interpretation generates a 
constitutive split in society: a division between representation and that which is represented. 
The loss of the political occurs in forms of ideology that do not recognise this division and the 
conflict that it can provoke. When the predominant representations of society no longer 
recognize their contingency, but are grounded in technical or natural necessity, for example, 
the space of the political is foreclosed. 
Rancière (1999, 2007) adopts a more emancipatory view of politicisation. For him, 
political action is about making something visible that was previously invisible in what he calls 
the ‘police order’. The police is a managerial practice of maintaining order whose logic is that 
there is nothing to see or hear beyond the dominant discourse, yet, its order is inevitably 
unequal and generates exclusions. Politics is about rupturing this order and making audible or 
visible what previously remained unheard or invisible. Specific to Rancière’s approach is that 
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he seems to give the political act a normative content: a political act always happens on the 
assumption of the equality of each and every one. A typical example is Rosa Parks, who acted 
on the assumption that she was equal to all other Americans by refusing to give up her seat 
to a white passenger. Many forms of environmental action follow this model. Think about 
activists who try to enter conference venues during climate summits, in order to take the floor 
and advocate a climate justice approach (Kenis and Mathijs, 2011), or indigenous groups who 
engage in direct action to stop mining projects (Bond 2012). They make a voice heard which 
was previously inaudible, and act as if they have an equal say as compared with much more 
powerful agents. By doing so, they not only expose the inegalitarianism, but also the 
contingency of the ‘police’ order. Even though political action always springs from a particular 
grief or demand, Rancière argues, it always has a universal dimension due to its egalitarian 
assumption. 
Slavoj Žižek (2000) has strongly relied on both the work of Rancière and that of Laclau 
and Mouffe to coin his own notion of post-politics. According to Žižek, a situation becomes 
politicised when a particular demand [e.g. climate justice] starts to function as a metaphoric 
condensation of an opposition against a concrete other [e.g. advocates of the green 
economy], in such a way that this particular demand acquires a universal dimension (Žižek 
2000, p. 204). Post-politics, in contrast, is when this us/them distinction disappears:  
In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which 
compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, 
public opinion specialists...) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of 
interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus (Žižek 
2000, p. 198).  
What remains invisible in post-politics is the fact that a social order is fundamentally 
contingent, and that grounding a social order always generates exclusions, and therefore, 
antagonisms.  
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to go much deeper into these often 
sophisticated articulations of the difference between politics and the political and of the 
notions of post-politics and depoliticisation that can be inferred from them. What is important 
to stress here is that, in these different political theories, the political is each time of a symbolic 
nature, and entails a discourse that recognises and makes visible the reality of conflict, power 
and the contingency of society. The point of the matter is that if society is no longer 
understood as divided and liable to be contested through political means, this undermines its 
democratic nature in a fundamental way (Lefort 1988). Democracy is before all else the form 
of society that acknowledges that it does not have an ultimate foundation, and that it is 
characterised by indeterminacy and contingency (Marchart 2007).  
Urry (2011) seems to have misunderstood this symbolic or discursive nature of the 
political, and therefore fails to appreciate what is at stake in the discussion of post-politics. 
This is most obvious when he speaks about the Transition Towns movement as being 
‘significantly political since it challenges the sedimented systems of twentieth-century carbon 
capitalism’ (Urry 2011, p. 92). While it is true that the movement advocates a kind of radical 
 7 
 
change in local communities, this is not sufficient to make it properly political. Indeed, the 
movement’s stress on consensus-seeking, all-round cooperation and the psychology of 
change, as well as its aversion to conflict and its blindness to power relations in fact qualify it 
as an outstanding example of post-politics (Kenis and Mathijs 2009).  
This does not mean there are no actors who genuinely try to repoliticise and build a 
counterhegemonic discourse; think for example about the ‘climate justice’ movement  
(Schlosberg 2013), mentioned above, which explicitly questions the new hegemonic discourse 
around the green economy (Mueller and Bullard 2011). However, the very existence of such 
forms of resistance does not disprove the critique of the post-political nature of hegemonic 
eco-political discourses. Similarly, the fact that there might be disagreement among 
international negotiators during UN summits about whether emissions trading rather than a 
carbon tax is the best suitable measure for putting a price on carbon does not disapprove the 
post-political thesis. Being largely of a technical and managerial nature, this is not the kind of 
conflict or debate that makes visible and therefore contestable the fundamental political 
principles in terms of which our society is instituted or organised.  
 
The environment  
Though post-political tendencies seem to permeate society as a whole today, post-politics 
seems to be particularly persistent in eco-political discourses (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010a). In 
this section, we bring out some of the features of the latter that make it so liable to post-
politics. This evidently brings us to question the notion of the ‘environment’ itself, a notion 
that, as many scholars have noticed, cannot easily be determined (e.g., Castree 2005, 
Swyngedouw 2007, 2010b, Morton 2007). As Noel Castree (2005, p. 8) explains, everyone will 
consider trees, butterflies or hurricanes to be part of ‘nature’ or the ‘environment’. In their 
commonplace definitions, the ‘environment’ and ‘nature’ simply refer to the non-human 
world. However, a deeper examination shows that bounds are not that easy to demarcate. 
Castree gives the examples of Occidental’s former Canvey Island site (a disused oil refinery 
that has turned into one of the most biodiverse sites in Western Europe) and biotechnical labs. 
Do these still belong to the ‘environment’; are they ‘nature’, or not? Furthermore, as Castree 
(2005, p. 8) indicates, if one looks a little further, nature encompasses humans as well: ‘(a)t 
some level, our biological capacities condition what we are able to do at all stages of our lives. 
In this sense, nature is always already here – intimately a part of us – not just somewhere else 
or beyond us’. So much is clear: ‘nature continues to be understood in a multitude of ways, 
many of them incompatible’ (Castree 2005, p. xvii). Still, the term ‘environment’ suggests we 
are talking about something unambiguous, something ‘out there’ that surrounds us. This 
connotation does not appear out of thin air. It corresponds to the way ‘nature’ has been 
externalised throughout modern history (Adam 1998; Fitzsimmons 1989; Magdoff and Foster 
2011).   
The representation of nature as external to the social has important depoliticising 
effects since it makes the political nature of certain events and processes invisible, and 
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therefore, uncontestable. Think for example about the floods in Pakistan, the drought in 
Moscow in the summer of 2010, or hurricane Katrina. Should we consider them mere 
‘environmental’ disasters (Žižek 2009b)? Imagine, in the case of Katrina, that there would have 
been better preparation (reinforcement work on the levées, evacuation of people at the 
announcement of the hurricane, targeted intervention after the hurricane); then large parts 
of the disaster could then have been avoided. Does this not show that ‘nature’ and ‘society’ 
are inextricably linked, and that misrecognising this link and externalising nature can be a royal 
road to post-politics? It seems significant that many Americans started to pray to God in order 
to save them from the flood instead of demanding political support.  
It could be argued that exactly this discursive separation of nature from society and 
the lack of reference to social relations make environmental issues so vulnerable for post-
politics. From another perspective, this suggests that the repoliticisation of environmental 
issues requires the latter’s connection to social issues. These are often more divisive and can 
be more easily politicised by relating them to an emancipatory discourses on equality, for 
example. Further elaborating upon the work of Rancière, both Swyngedouw (2010a) and Žižek 
(2008) suggest such a way out of post-politics.  
In several of his articles, Swyngedouw (2007, 2009, 2010a) argues that one of the 
reasons why environmental questions are so easily depolicitised is because they lack a 
privileged subject of change. According to him, this distinguishes environmentalism from 
other ‘social’ movements, such as feminism, the civil rights movement or the labour 
movement. In the latter, the subject of oppression, struggle and change is easily identified: 
women, African-Americans or workers, respectively, are amongst the first to speak out about 
what is wrong and what needs to change. When these subjects appropriate democratic or 
emancipatory language (e.g., egalitarian discourse), their condition can be politicised and 
altered. 
Swyngedouw is not alone in focusing on the role of the subject in processes of 
policitisation and depoliticisation. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have equally argued that social 
movements produce new subjectivities that can politicise social relations or spaces that were 
not previously considered political, and through this, they can become the bearers of a process 
of radicalisation of democracy. Similarly, Schmitt (1996) has argued that if political action and 
thought is about conflict, decision and the exercise of power, the question of the subject is 
unavoidable. According to him, politics is even the realm of subjectivity par excellence.  
But who is the subject that fights the environmental struggle? This is far from easy to 
answer. In some environmental circles, environmental disasters are portrayed as ‘nature’s’ 
revenge for human pollution, but this is of course a very mystifying way of speaking (Chase 
1991). Nature does not act, take revenge, or struggle. Someone has to speak about or in the 
name of nature for nature to become politically salient (Castree, 2005). Climate change has 
been taking place for many decades, but extensive scientific reports and numerous actions 
were required in order to bring visibility to the problem and to put it on the agenda. 
Environmental problems only exist as political problems to the extent that there are 
representations of them in the public sphere.  
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Environmental struggles are often not framed as emancipatory struggles of a particular 
subject, in contrast to feminism, the civil rights movement or labour struggle. They are about 
how we, or human society, relate to the planet. Since we all belong to the planet, everybody 
(or nobody?) seems to be in a position to speak in nature’s name. As a result, environmental 
questions lend themselves easily to a discourse suggesting that ‘we are all in this together’ 
and that we, therefore, have to cooperate, create partnerships and reach consensus. If 
‘everyone together’ is the subject of environmental questions, post-politics is the evident 
result (Swyngedouw 2007).  
Žižek (2008, 2009a, p. 91) goes a step further by claiming that the repoliticisation of 
environmental questions is a matter not only of affirming political subjectivity but of 
redefining them as emancipatory struggles. He distinguishes four possible contemporary 
antagonisms that could lead to repoliticising the present. These are, summarily: the 
environmental crisis; the inappropriateness of private property principles for ‘intellectual 
property’; new techno-scientific developments (especially in bio-genetics); and what he calls 
‘new forms of apartheid’, or ‘new walls and slums’ that separate the ‘Excluded’ from the 
‘Included’. After elaborating on these four themes, Žižek (2008) states:  
In the series of the four antagonisms, the one between the Included and the Excluded is the 
crucial one, the point of reference for the others. Without it, all others lose their subversive 
edge: ecology turns into a ‘problem of sustainable development’, ‘intellectual property’ into a 
‘complex legal challenge’, biogenetics into an ‘ethical’ issue.  
In other words, the question of the excluded subject is the critical one, it forms the 
vantage point through which all the other questions should be approached and politicised. 
Žižek thus turns environmental questions into emancipation struggles. The risk of such 
an approach, however, is that it creates other forms of depoliticisation. It starts from a 
normative idea of what politicisation should consist of – the struggle for equality for example. 
In this regard, Žižek’s approach is vulnerable to the critique that Oliver Marchart (2007, p. 159) 
formulated against Rancière’s notion of the political, upon which Žižek heavily relies. 
Marchart’s critique is that Rancière relies on an ‘emancipatory apriorism’, and in this sense 
restricts the scope of what politicisation might consist of and unduly closes the openness and 
contingency that is inherent to ‘the political’. 
Without doubt, there are good reasons to repoliticise environmental questions by 
pointing to social subjects striving for equality and emancipation, thereby showing the 
intertwinement of environmental affairs and social relations. Think, for instance, about many 
eco-feminist movements (Mellor 1997), or about indigenous peoples striving for their rights 
confronted with nature conservation projects in a post-colonial constellation (Reimerson 
2012) or fighting against the exploitation of tar sands (Nikiforuk 2008). More than others, 
these people are affected by environmental crises, and one could argue that a solution to 
those crises requires that they – in a genuinely emancipatory fashion – raise their voices and 
demand change.  
By focusing on the social relations that cause environmental destruction, one not only 
acquires a view of possible subjects of change, but also of the objects of change. Indeed, the 
fact that environmental issues are so easily depoliticised should be attributed not only to the 
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fact that there is no privileged subject, but also to the fact that no specific objects appear as 
the evident focus for environmental change.2 Strictly speaking, every single social relation, 
practice or event has an environmental impact. There is hardly a social practice that cannot 
be said to partake in the process of throughput, in which energy and matter is appropriated, 
and subsequently emitted in a deteriorated form (Foster et al. 2010). As all things have an 
environmental impact, the object of environmental concern is, in principle, everything. It is 
also in this sense that environmental issues differ from ‘social’ struggles. The peace movement 
provides a good illustration. On the one hand, the peace movement also lacks a clear subject 
of change: in this regard, it readily lends itself to a consensual and cooperative discourse 
suggesting ‘we should all march together against war’. Yet, on the other hand, the peace 
movement has a precise object or opponent, namely, war and, more specifically, the actors 
engaged in and responsible for war. The same cannot be said so easily of many environmental 
questions. 
That everything is or can be in principle the object of environmental change could lead 
to the conclusion that an extremely profound transformation is needed, one that embraces 
every human or social practice. In actual contemporary eco-political discourses, however, 
another conclusion dominates the scene. In the case of climate change, for example, what one 
opposes first and foremost are not necessarily specific, particularly polluting practices, let 
alone specific social actors who bear special responsibility for these. Rather, one opposes CO2 
as such, which is the by-product of almost all thinkable practices (even breathing). The result 
is a discourse of ‘society versus CO2’ (Swyngedouw 2007, p. 27). The ‘enemy’ and every conflict 
are thus externalised. ‘Act on CO2’ becomes the motto of this discourse, as a slogan used by 
the British government aptly summarises (Urry 2011, p. 90).  
Policy options like emissions trading reinforce this approach, as they equalise all CO2 
emitted, whatever its source (Lohmann 2006, see also Descheneau 2012): the CO2 emitted by 
a steel factory is rendered equal to that emitted by a hospital, by a wild camel in the remote 
regions of Australia, or by a tree being cut down. The CO2 emission saved by building more 
efficient coal-fired power stations is equalised with that saved by building windmills. The fact 
that the latter is a step on the pathway to a sustainable energy system while the former 
remains within the fossil fuel model is no longer of any account. This equalisation prevents 
people from making conscious political choices or choosing priorities. 
The foregoing seems to lead to an easy conclusion: if we want to repoliticise 
environmental issues, not only ‘nature’, but also every enmity and conflict should be 
‘internalised’ again. Indeed, insofar as environmental crises are not crises of ‘nature’ but of 
society and how the latter relates to its ‘natural’ conditions (Foster et al. 2010), real solutions 
require social change. In other words, we should turn environmental crises into social ones.  
As already suggested, however, such a move involves risks, even if it has many merits. 
While it is crucial to make the antagonisms that cut through ‘the people’ and their socially 
constructed relation with nature visible (Swyngedouw 2010a), 3 there is a risk that by 
upholding a normative, emancipatory conception of politicisation related to specific subject 
 11 
 
positions, the space of ‘the political’ in environmental politics is unduly narrowed down, and 
we lose sight of other types of politicisation that might occur on this terrain. 
 
Paradoxes 
How, then, can we repoliticise environmental issues without turning them into mere social or 
normative issues? In order to address this question, let us first investigate a paradox that is 
present in post-political discourses. Emphasising over and over that we should reach 
consensus, or that certain technical or managerial solutions are neither politically left nor right 
(Giddens 2009, p. 114) but neutral, seems suspicious: even behind the most neutralising 
discourses seems to lurk a polemical dimension. What this means can be illuminated with the 
help of an insight from Schmitt (1996), for whom conflict is the essence of the political. In his 
book The Concept of the Political, he states that one cannot understand a discourse if one 
does not know whom it is affecting or targeting:  
Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, 
absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are 
incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or 
negated by such a term (Schmitt 1996, p. 30-31).  
Political discourses, he argues, always have a polemical thrust, and their meaning can be truly 
understood only when this polemical dimension is disclosed. Even though certain discourses 
do not refer to a concrete opponent, there is always one, at least implicitly. A humanitarian 
discourse, for example, always entails an implicit reference to something or someone that lies 
outside humanity, to an inhuman being, a radical enemy that has to be crushed (Lievens 2010, 
2012). From this perspective, it is possible to engage in a symptomatic reading of post-political 
discourses that argue for all-round cooperation and consensus-seeking. From a Schmittian 
perspective, the repeated invocation of the need for consensus would appear meaningless if 
there were no other strategies or discourses that reject consensus-seeking. The political 
meaning of discourses arguing for cooperation can only be revealed by pointing to the implicit 
opponent they aim to polemically affect, namely, discourses that openly advocate the need 
for a more conflictual approach. Discourses stating that the conflict approach is obsolete and 
that we all ought to work together are, in a paradoxical fashion, very polemical.  
‘There is a war between the ones who say there is a war and the ones who say there 
isn’t’, Leonard Cohen sang in 1974. He thus adequately captured the metaconflict that is at 
stake here. Many post-political discourses would be utterly meaningless in the absence of an 
opponent on this meta-level. It makes perhaps more sense, therefore, to consider post-politics 
as a type of discourse that, despite itself, takes sides and engages in conflict. This conflict is 
situated on a meta-level, but it is a conflict nevertheless. Its opponent is not a particular agent, 
but the conflict approach as such. The relevance for revealing this meta-conflict is that it can 
provide the conditions for repoliticising supposedly post-political discourses and for moving 
beyond pessimistic diagnoses of post-politics. It enables a kind of reversal of perspectives, 
through which we are able to see politicisation as a potentiality within post-politics. After all, 
even the discourse about the need for consensus against an externalised enemy such as CO2 
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subtly refers to yet another enemy. This approach can also help to deconstruct post-political 
representations in the framework of the post-ecologist turn.  
 
The post-ecologist turn as a hegemonic struggle 
We can now return to Blühdorn’s ‘pessimistic’ account of post-ecological politics. While 
agreeing with the basic tenets of his analysis, we would like to suggest a political re-reading 
of the process that has led to this post-ecological condition. The question is whether the post-
ecologist turn cannot better be described in terms of struggle, defeat and victory rather than 
as a fatal result of the process of modernisation.  
A famous remark by William Morris, the 19th century utopian socialist, hints at a 
possible alternative description of the roots of this shift. In his novel A Dream of John Ball, 
Morris writes: ‘Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about 
in spite of their defeat, and then it turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have 
to fight for what they meant under another name’ (Morris 1886). This seems to be exactly 
what is at stake in the shift towards post-ecological politics: political and economic elites have 
appropriated and even recuperated environmental concerns of genuine environmental 
movements, but in so doing fundamentally transformed these concerns. Significantly, 
Blühdorn and Welsh point to such a logic of recuperation when they argue (2007, p. 192) that 
‘sustainable development has been appropriated by established political parties and re-spun 
in such a way that the state/corporate nexus, operating through deepening public-private 
partnerships, emerges as the central means of delivering sustainability’. What happened, 
indeed, was a ‘selective mainstreaming and post-ecologist reframing of environmental 
concerns’ (Blühdorn and Welsh 2007, p. 195). 
Interestingly, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000) have used Morris’ quote to refer 
to the complex process through which constituted powers appropriate ideas, practices and 
demands from resistance movements, translate them, and use them in order to restructure 
their own modes of operation.4 We could argue that ecological modernisation, green growth 
or the green economy partake of the same logic: economic or political elites appropriate and 
translate environmental concerns and integrate them within a process of technocratic and 
market-oriented modernisation (Mueller and Passadakis 2010, Mueller and Bullard 2011, 
Kenis and Lievens 2012). What is at stake here is not an inexorable social process but one that 
is fundamentally political: it is a struggle for hegemony; in other words, a struggle through 
which central elements of eco-political discourse are appropriated and integrated within a 
specific political project (Mouffe 1979). 
Significantly, however, the political success of economic and political elites in 
appropriating environmental concerns and integrating them within a market-driven and 
technocratic project has to a large extent been conditional upon rendering invisible the very 
hegemonic struggle that underlies this shift. In other words, the new eco-political discourses 
could only be effective to the extent that the stakes of this shift became invisible or were 
depoliticised. The technocratic or neutral self-description of ecological modernisation or the 
green economy have thus been a crucial element of the hegemonic process. 
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Yet, symptomatically, a remainder of this hegemonic struggle inevitably pops up. Is not 
the invocation of the need for consensus and the recurring arguments against conflict 
approaches and against the need for making difficult choices and trade-offs a significant form 
of struggle on a meta-level? The quotes from Blair and Giddens at the beginning of this 
discussion are significant examples of this. Similarly, the advocates of the green economy are 
at pains to reject the idea that addressing environmental crises requires difficult trade-offs 
and that this might entail sharp conflicts. The (in)famous slogan ‘People Planet Profit’ that is 
central to many green economy discourses precisely suggests it is possible to reconcile these 
very different values, and thus to evade conflicts between them. It is ‘a myth’, the UNEP report 
on the green economy argues, for example, ‘that there is an inescapable trade-off between 
environmental sustainability and economic progress’ (UNEP 2011, p. 16). ‘People, planet, 
profit is the mantra already adopted by many companies in the pursuit of corporate 
sustainability’, Achim Steiner, under-secretary of UNEP, states, ‘but if we are to truly 
transform the economic paradigm then it needs to be adopted by many, many more’ (UNEP 
2012). Significantly, all these statements do not primarily state that there is consensus or 
reconciliation, but invoke the very need for consensus, and subtly hint at invisible others who 
think conflict, trade-offs, difficult decisions and power struggles are perhaps inevitable.5 
 
Beyond post-politics? 
The argument developed in the previous sections opens the door for a repoliticisation of 
environmental questions that does not necessarily require a reference to a particular subject 
and its emancipatory struggle. In this section, we want to argue that, paradoxically, 
environmental questions are not only easily depoliticised, but in an interesting and 
paradoxical way, also have the potential for a kind of politicisation par excellence. 
Importantly, two conclusions can follow from the observation that environmental 
issues lack an undisputable subject and object of change. On the one hand, it can support the 
idea that we are all in this together, that we should therefore collaborate, and that, for 
example in the case of climate change, CO2 is the common externalised ‘enemy’ to which we 
are all opposed. On the other hand, however, it can broaden the terrain for hegemonic 
struggle around the appropriation and translation of environmental concerns. If everything 
can be the object of environmental action, there can be an all-round struggle over what ought 
to be the proper object of this action. Furthermore, if everybody can constitute herself as the 
subject of this question, there is no a priori exclusion of who can present herself as the bearer 
of a project that can overcome environmental crises. This potentially allows for the most 
radical forms of political plurality and politicisation imaginable. Hegemonic struggle and 
politicisation can then appear in their purest form. 
Of these two possible conclusions, the first tends to be predominant, but nevertheless 
remains unstable, representing a kind of political struggle in disguise. In a subtle way, active 
attempts to depoliticise exhibit or reveal that which they want to cover up. In this sense, the 
repoliticisation of eco-political discourses should start by confronting these discourses with 
their own political assumptions, thus turning them against themselves. 
 14 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the beginning of this discussion, we argued that recent shifts in eco-political discourses, as 
they have been theorised, amongst others, in terms of the ‘post-ecologist turn’, are part of a 
broader post-political trend. Pointing to the possibility of a political re-interpretation of the 
post-ecologist turn, we have argued that the latter is perhaps not merely the consequence of 
ongoing and unavoidable modernisation processes, but that it at least partly results from a 
hegemonic re-appropriation and translation of environmental concerns, while this hegemonic 
process is at the same time concealed. The very fact that this concealment is never complete, 
as the invocation of the need for consensus reveals an underlying polemic, allows us to move 
beyond pessimistic accounts of the current predicament of environmental politics. Indeed, 
the presence of this polemic in disguise shows that, more fundamentally, a political process is 
at stake, and the revelation of this fact can provide the starting point for a repoliticisation of 
the environmental sphere.  
Significantly, environmental questions are not only easily depoliticised, as we have 
shown, but could also become the terrain of politicisation par excellence: because everyone 
can appropriate these questions and give them a specific content, a genuinely political space 
of plurality can appear, where conflict, contingency and power can become visible and 
contestable as such. Because repoliticisation brings different voices to the fore and shows the 
contingency of current societal structures, this is not only intrinsically important from a 
democratic point of view, but also helps to open the door for real and effective change. 
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1 Of course, the field of discourses on environmental politics has always consisted of a variety of currents, differing, 
amongst other things, in terms of the extent to which they thought it would be possible to reach environmental 
progress within the boundaries of the existing form of society. Nevertheless, as Blühdorn (2013) aptly shows, there 
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is a significant difference between discourses on environmental politics that are predominant now, and discourses 
of some decennia ago. 
2 We thank Gareth Dale for his inspiring input during a seminar in Leuven on this issue. 
3 Erik Swyngedouw strongly warns against the reduction of the political to the social, but at the same time he 
follows the Rancierian approach to repoliticisation and, as a result, also tends to end up with a form of 
emancipatory apriorism. 
4 Antonio Gramsci (1998, p. 106) has understood such processes as ‘passive revolutions’.  
5 Blühdorn (2007a) argues that current self-descriptions of society lead to forms of self-deception. Discourses of 
change are used in order to retain the unsustainable status quo. However, the very invocation of the need for 
consensus betrays society’s divided nature, as a result of which self-deception can only be partly successful. 
